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Abstract. This study examines the predictability of monthly returns on equity real estate
investment trusts (EREITs) over the period 1975–95 and compares it with that for small-
and mid-cap ﬁrms. Using the time series approach of Jegadeesh (1990), evidence is found
that monthly EREIT returns are predictable based on past performance. However, the
predictability is not substantial enough to cover typical transactions costs, so that there
is no evidence of unexploited arbitrage opportunities.
The magnitude of EREIT predictability also is examined over different time periods, with
the greatest amount found in the most recent data since 1992, which marks the emergence
of the new wave of EREITs. Finally, persistence in individual REIT return performance
is examined using a nonparametric technique. Limited evidence of persistence in
performance is found, with retail-oriented REITs tending to exhibit the most persistence.
Introduction
This study examines the predictability of returns for equity real estate investment trusts
(EREITs). Researchers have documented the predictability of stock returns in general,
but the nature of real estate markets may be such that the extent to which EREIT
returns are predictable differs from that of other stocks. For example, if a REIT’s
primary source of income is from long-term leases to credit quality tenants in an
existing portfolio of properties, then its cash ﬂows almost certainly are more stable
and predictable than those of (say) a software producer. In the absence of shocks to
the determinants of discount rates, the total return series for such REITs should
resemble a random walk, as signiﬁcant deviations from the returns implied by the net
rents could easily be exploited.
The large number of REIT initial public offerings (IPOs) in recent years and the repeal
of the ﬁve-or-fewer rule have resulted in increased institutional interest in securitized
real estate. Furthermore, a number of mutual funds specializing in real estate have
emerged in recent years. These funds provide individual investors with additional
alternatives for real estate investment. The increased ability to use REITs as part of
an asset allocation process calls for additional understanding of their return behavior.
Existing empirical research has followed two main approaches in examining stock
return predictability. The cross-sectional approach involves characterizing return
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behavior as a function of other variables. The explanatory variables can be
macroeconomic, such as those used by Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) in their study of
stock returns and by Chan, Hendershott and Sanders (1990) in their REIT return
analysis. Other researchers such as Fama and French (1992) have employed ﬁrm-
speciﬁc variables including ﬁrm size, the price-earnings ratio and the book-to-market
ratio to explain stock return behavior. The most recent work of this type reports
evidence of predictability. However, the ﬁndings are mixed as to whether REITs differ
from stocks in this regard. Liu and Mei (1992) conclude that expected excess returns
on EREITs are more predictable than stocks in general. However, Li and Wang’s
(1995) analysis using a multi-factor asset pricing model ﬁnds that the extent of
predictability in REIT returns is about the same as for stocks. Peterson and Hsieh
(1997) report that the risk premium on EREITs is related to the market risk premium,
and to size and book-to-market factors.
The analysis of predictability in this study uses the time-series approach proposed by
Jegadeesh (1990). This approach relies only on past returns and does not require the
speciﬁcation of an asset-pricing model for the return generating process. Moreover,
the approach is intuitive and straightforward, in the sense that it addresses whether
an investor can analyze the past behavior of returns and construct a portfolio of REITs
that will earn abnormal proﬁts in the future. For example, if REIT returns exhibit
positive serial correlation, then it may be proﬁtable to buy past winners and sell past
losers. On the other hand, a pattern of negative correlation would suggest a contrarian
approach involving buying past losers and selling past winners.
EREIT return predictability is investigated here using monthly return data for
portfolios of EREITs over the 1975–95 period and for three subperiods, including the
1992–95 period marking the emergence of the new wave of REITs. Monthly data are
utilized because of the signiﬁcant thin-trading biases that make analyses of shorter
return horizons difﬁcult.1 Our analysis ﬁnds that monthly EREIT returns are
signiﬁcantly negatively autocorrelated at the ﬁrst (and only the ﬁrst) lag. This pattern
leads us to investigate whether buying the previous month’s underperformers and
selling the previous month’s overperformers is a proﬁtable strategy. The return to such
a contrarian strategy is about 1.1% per month. While this is statistically signiﬁcant,
it is not large enough to cover all transactions costs including those associated with
the bid-ask spread, commissions and possible price impact effects.
In addition, REIT return predictability is compared to that of small- and mid-cap
stocks. This represents the ﬁrst effort of which we are aware that directly examines
whether EREIT predictability is different from that for size portfolios. Until very
recently, EREITs generally were among the smallest capitalization issues. The
autocorrelation structures of monthly small stock and EREIT returns are similar, with
both having signiﬁcantly negative correlation coefﬁcients at the ﬁrst lag. Estimated
total returns from following the contrarian strategy noted above are somewhat greater
for small cap stocks in general than they are for EREITs.2 This ﬁnding is consistent
with the hypothesis noted earlier that relatively stable cash ﬂows associated withTHE PREDICTABILITY OF EQUITY REIT RETURNS 253
longer-term leases on most real properties should make it easier to identify arbitrage
opportunities among EREITs, and thereby render their returns less predictable.
There is no statistically or economically signiﬁcant evidence that mid-cap stock
returns are predictable. It appears that once ﬁrms become fairly large and trading in
their stock becomes more liquid, no proﬁtable contrarian trading strategy is feasible.
This leads us to suspect that, as consolidation in the REIT industry continues and
ﬁrms become increasingly large, the statistically signiﬁcant negative autocorrelation
pattern exhibited by EREITs will disappear. Given that EREIT return predictability
certainly has been no stronger than for the average small capitalization ﬁrm, there is
no reason to suspect that, in a future time when EREITs are larger ﬁrms, their returns
will be more predictable than for similarly-sized ﬁrms not in the real estate industry.
Finally, predictability at the individual REIT level is examined by conducting
nonparametric tests for persistence in REIT returns. Some evidence of persistence is
found, with a small sample of retail REITs found to have a higher than average
persistence. In general, the pattern of persistence is consistent with the negative
autocorrelation structure discussed.
Empirical Tests of REIT Return Predictability
Monthly returns on all EREITs in the CRSP NYSE/AMEX and NASDAQ Data Files
were obtained over the period 1975–95. While EREITs existed prior to 1975, the
number of ﬁrms then is too small to conduct a meaningful analysis of their return
predictability.3 The total number of EREITs throughout the sample period is 148.
Autocorrelation in REIT Returns
The assessment of REIT return predictability begins with an examination of the
autocorrelation in REIT returns because the presence of signiﬁcant correlations
between current and lagged returns raises the possibility of proﬁtable trading
strategies. The difference in the ith ﬁrm’s monthly return (Rit) from its average return
(Rit), where the average is deﬁned as the average monthly return on the ith REIT over
the period t 1 1t ot 1 6, is regressed on an intercept and twelve lags of the ﬁrm’s
monthly returns as illustrated below.4
12
˜ R 2 R 5 a 1 aR 1 u O it it 0tj t i t 2ji t
j51
Results from these autocorrelation regressions are presented in Exhibit 1. The only
statistically signiﬁcant result is for the ﬁrst lag. The coefﬁcient at the one-month lag
is 20.135, with an associated p-value of 0.000. Because REITs until very recently
tended to have small equity market capitalizations and a strong January effect in their
returns, the return correlation patterns during January and for the eleven months
excluding January were also examined.5 Those results are presented in the middle and254 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
VOLUME 16, NUMBER 3, 1998
Exhibit 1





















































































This exhibit reports the results of cross-sectional regressions of monthly REIT excess returns on
past returns. The model is of the form:
12
˜ R 2 R 5 a 1 aR 1 u , O it it 0tj t i t 2ji t
j51
where Rit is the return on REIT i in month t and Rit is the average monthly return on REIT i over
the period t 1 1t ot 1 6. The regression is performed each month over the period of 1975–95. The
reported parameters are the average of the time series of coefﬁcients. The p-value (in parentheses)
is the probability that average of the time series of coefﬁcients is equal to zero.THE PREDICTABILITY OF EQUITY REIT RETURNS 255
right-most columns of Exhibit 1, and indicate that the autocorrelation pattern is not
being driven by a January effect.
Formation of Predictive Portfolios
Similar to the procedure in Jegadeesh (1990), predictive portfolios are formed by
sorting REITs into groups based on their prior returns. Researchers using large
samples to study overall stock return predictability typically divide their ﬁrms into
ten decile portfolios. Since the total number of EREITs in the 1970s and 1980s is
relatively small, only two portfolios are created here. The prior month’s returns serve
as the basis for forming the portfolios, since the autocorrelations reported in Exhibit
1 were strongest at the ﬁrst lag. For each month, the half of the sample of REITs
with the highest returns in that month is assigned to the portfolio labeled HI, with the
other half of the sample placed into the portfolio called LO. Returns on these two
portfolios for the following month are then computed. The portfolios are then
rebalanced, based on the individual REIT returns for the following month. Average
returns on these two portfolios are compared to examine the proﬁtability of a
contrarian trading strategy that exploits the negative autocorrelation structure.
The portfolio analysis discussed above also is performed for a subset of ﬁrms
specializing in the ownership and operation of retail properties. It was not feasible to
study other property types individually because of the small number of such ﬁrms
throughout much of the sample period covered.
Results of Predictability Tests: EREITs vs. Small- and Mid-Cap Stocks
Exhibit 2 reports the results of the predictability analysis for the entire 1975–95
sample period. The ﬁndings in the ﬁrst column of the top panel, based on all months
including January, document the total returns to following a strategy of buying past
underperformers and selling past overperformers. The mean (median) return for the
LO portfolio is 2.1% (1.3%), while the mean (median) for the HI portfolio is only
1.0% (0.8%). This pattern is consistent with the autocorrelation results in Exhibit 1,
and suggests some overreaction in EREIT returns with relatively low returns in month
t being followed in month t 1 1 by relatively high returns.6 The third row reports that
the difference in the mean returns on these two portfolios, which represents the total
return on a portfolio created by buying past losers and selling past winners, is
approximately 1.1% per month. This difference is highly statistically signiﬁcant (the
p-value is 0.0001), but the economic signiﬁcance is limited once transactions costs
such as commissions, the bid-ask spread and the market price impact of a trade are
considered. While institutional investors may be able trade at negligible commission
costs, Nelling, Mahoney, Hildebrand and Goldstein (1995) document that the average
bid-ask spread on EREITs was greater than 5% of the share price between 1985 and
1990. The small market capitalizations of EREITs prior to 1985 virtually guarantees
similarly high spreads over the 1975–84 period. Average ﬁrm size among REITs has
increased in recent years, but the typical EREIT still was small in terms of all traded
ﬁrms in the early 1990s. Hence, bid-ask spreads and other transactions costs appear256 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 2


























p-values for test that
P(LO) 2 P(HI) . 0 0.0001 0.0283 0.0001
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p-values for test that
P(LO) 2 P(HI) . 0 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
This exhibit reports the mean (median) returns for predictive portfolios of EREITs, and also for
small- and mid-cap stocks. Two equally-weighted portfolios, P(HI) and P(LO), are formed each
month by sorting EREITs based on the prior month’s returns. P(HI) is the portfolio of REITs that
had the largest returns in the prior month, and P(LO) is the portfolio of REITs that had the smallest
returns. Small-cap stocks are those in the lowest decile of market capitalization, and mid-cap stocks
are those in the sixth decile. p-values test whether the difference in mean returns across the two
portfolios is equal to zero. The sample period is 1975–95.THE PREDICTABILITY OF EQUITY REIT RETURNS 257
to have been more than large enough to eliminate any arbitrage proﬁts associated with
the limited predictability that exists in REIT returns.7
The extent to which the HI and LO portfolios must be rebalanced each month is also
related to the transactions cost issue. In other words, if many of the REITs in each
portfolio tend to remain within the same portfolio from one month to the next, the
typical cost of buying or selling an individual security would tend to overstate the
cost of rebalancing the entire portfolio. An examination of the amount of rebalancing
required each month found that, on average, 47% of the REITs in a portfolio in month
t were also in the same portfolio in month t 2 1. The remaining 53% either moved
from the other portfolio or entered the sample for the ﬁrst time. This suggests that
the rebalancing cost for the above strategy is approximately one-half of the typical
round-trip transaction cost for an individual REIT. The difference in returns of 1.1%
suggests that the strategy would only be proﬁtable when round-trip transaction costs
are about 2% or lower. As noted, the relevant transactions costs include commissions,
the bid-ask spread and the market price impact of a trade, and are highly likely to
exceed 2% for the typical REIT during our sample period.
The other two columns of Exhibit 2 report the predictive portfolio returns separately
for January and the rest of the year. Note that for EREITs, the difference in returns
for the HI and LO portfolios is much larger in January: 2.3% and 1.7% at the mean
and median, respectively. However, this is still not large enough to cover transactions
costs, on average. The differences in returns across the two portfolios when January
is excluded are virtually indistinguishable from the results when January is included,
as seen by comparing the third rows of columns 1 and 3 in Exhibit 2.8
A Comparison of REIT Return Predictability with that of Small- and Mid-Cap Stocks
In order to compare the predictability of REIT returns with that of other stocks, the
autocorrelation structures of the returns on portfolios of small and mid-cap stocks
were examined. These small and mid-cap portfolios were created using stocks in the
tenth and sixth ﬁrm size deciles, respectively, for all NYSE and AMEX ﬁrms. Small
stocks were used for comparison because REITs have until recently tended to be small
in market capitalization. The results for the small stock portfolio were very similar to
those reported in Exhibit 1 for the EREITs (i.e., the only statistically signiﬁcant
correlation coefﬁcient is at the ﬁrst lag). Its sign and magnitude of 20.127 are very
similar to that for EREITs, which was 20.135 at the ﬁrst lag. The autocorrelation
structure of the mid-cap stocks from the sixth decile of the size distribution exhibited
no statistically signiﬁcant lagged correlation. These correlation coefﬁcients were
insigniﬁcantly different from zero and small in magnitude.9
Of course, the economic signiﬁcance of the autocorrelation structure is based upon
whether meaningfully positive returns can be generated from a trading strategy based
on the return history. Panels B and C of Exhibit 2 report results for predictive
portfolios of small- and mid-cap stocks analogous to those created for the EREITs.258 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Panel B of Exhibit 2 shows that using the contrarian strategy of buying last month’s
underperformers and selling last month’s overperformers yields a difference in returns
of 2.8% per month on the LO and HI portfolios for the ﬁrms in the tenth decile. This
is 2.6 times the 1.1% monthly return on the EREIT portfolios. As is the case for the
EREITs, the difference is substantially higher in January (9.2%) than for the rest of
the year.10 The lower total return from trying to exploit EREIT return predictability
in this manner could be due, at least partially, to the nature of long-term leases and
the relative stability of operating expenses. These factors make the net cash ﬂows of
a REIT relatively predictable—at least when compared to other industries such as
computer software and biotech in which small ﬁrms often bring rapid and
unpredictable technological change.11 If net cash ﬂows for REITs can be predicted
relatively more easily and accurately, then persistent returns inconsistent with the
expected cash ﬂows can be more readily exploited by investors, especially if discount
rates are not varying substantially.12 In such a case, one would expect less return
predictability for REITs, which is consistent with the ﬁndings reported in Exhibit 2.
Given that there is no signiﬁcant autocorrelation in mid-cap stock returns, it is not
surprising that Panel C of Exhibit 2 shows that there is very little gain to a contrarian
investment strategy in these ﬁrms. The estimated total monthly return of 0.5% is not
statistically signiﬁcantly different from zero. The difference in January is only 1.1%.
The relevant implication of this is not that REITs and other small ﬁrms have more
predictable returns than do larger ﬁrms, but that as consolidation in the EREIT
industry continues and the average ﬁrm size grows, the negative autocorrelation
pattern reported above may disappear. Given that EREIT returns have not exhibited
more predictability than is the case for small non-real estate ﬁrms (at least in the
sense that a contrarian investment strategy generates higher total returns), it seems
unlikely that the returns on EREITs that have grown over time into mid-cap stocks
would be more predictable than other similarly-sized ﬁrms not in the real estate
business.13
Results of Predictability Tests for Different Time Periods
Exhibit 3 reports the results regarding predictability over three time periods: 1975–
84, 1985–92 and 1993–95.14 These periods were chosen due to the changing nature
of the EREIT market. The mid-1980s was characterized by the emergence of health
care REITs, and the 1993–95 period was examined separately due to the very large
number of IPOs by EREITs in those years.
Panels B and C show that return predictability is highest in the 1975–85 and 1993–
95 periods. For those two periods, the mean differences in returns between the HI
and LO portfolios are highly statistically signiﬁcant, but once again, the difference of
about 1.5% per month is not large enough to cover transactions costs necessary to
exploit the predictability. It is not clear why the economic and statistical signiﬁcance
of predictability is so low between 1985 and 1992. Increasing coverage by analysts
and interest by the institutional investment community almost certainly cannot explain
this ﬁnding, since such coverage and interest was much greater in the 1993–95 period.THE PREDICTABILITY OF EQUITY REIT RETURNS 259
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p-values for test that
P(LO) 2 P(HI) . 0 0.0008 0.0380 0.0046
This exhibit reports the mean (median) returns for predictive portfolios of EREITs. Two equally-
weighted portfolios, P(HI) and P(LO), are formed each month by sorting EREITs based on the prior
month’s returns. P(HI) is the portfolio of REITs that had the largest returns in the prior month, and
P(LO) is the portfolio of REITs that had the smallest returns. p-values test whether the difference
in mean returns across the two portfolios is equal to zero. The sample period is 1975–95.
The mid-1980s did see a fairly large number of EREIT IPOs, a large fraction of which
were specialty health care ﬁrms.15 To determine whether the emergence of health care
REITs affects the results, the portfolio strategy was repeated after excluding health
care REITs, of which there were eight in the 1985–92 period. The results were nearly
identical to those using all REITs.260 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 4


























P(LO) 2 P(HI) . 0 0.3328 0.1889 0.7193
This exhibit reports the mean (median) returns for predictive portfolios of retail REITs. Two equally-
weighted portfolios, P(HI) and P(LO), are formed each month by sorting retail REITs based on the
prior month’s returns. P(HI) is the portfolio of REITs that had the largest returns in the prior month,
and P(LO) is the portfolio of REITs that had the smallest returns. p-values test whether thedifference
in mean returns across the two portfolios is equal to zero. The sample period is 1988–95.
Differences in risk between the HI and LO portfolios were examined for the overall
period and for the subperiods by estimating the beta coefﬁcient of each portfolio using
market model regression. For all time periods, the betas of the HI and LO portfolios
were nearly identical. As a result, the beta of the arbitrage portfolio would be very
close to zero, suggesting that the return on the contrarian strategy is not due to
differences in risk.
Other studies of stock return predictability such as Conrad, Hameed and Niden (1994)
use additional variables such as the number of transactions or trading volume in their
analysis. These were not used in this study of REIT predictability since for most of
the sample period, trading volume on REITs has tended to be relatively low, and
differences in volume are not likely to have a substantial effect on the results.
Results of Predictability Tests: A Retail REIT Sample
Exhibit 4 reports the ﬁndings when the analogous predictive portfolios are formed for
a sample of retail-oriented EREITs. There has been a substantial increase in the
number of retail REITs in the post-1992 period, and there were thirty-ﬁve ﬁrms
(primarily shopping center owners) from 1988–1995, which permitted the analysis of
return predictability for this group of ﬁrms.16 Panel A of Exhibit 4 shows that there
is no signiﬁcant evidence of return predictability among retail-oriented EREITs. A
comparison with other EREITs in Panel B indicates that return predictability for other
property types is statistically but not economically signiﬁcant. A more detailed
analysis of other property types, especially multifamily residential, awaits a longer
time series of returns.THE PREDICTABILITY OF EQUITY REIT RETURNS 261
Exhibit 5
Nonparametric Tests of Persistence in Monthly Returns of EREITs
OBS CUSIP NMISS NRUNS UCNT DCNT W975 WO25 DRANDOM
1 02649410 147 34 46 35 32.15 49.35 1
2 05528610 184 28 19 25 16.29 28.89 1
3 05564E10 69 95 83 76 68.05 92.64 0
4 09690310 150 40 37 41 31.32 48.47 1
5 10458310 126 60 45 57 41.58 61.01 1
6 12232C10 146 56 41 41 33.18 50.82 0
7 15043810 145 49 39 44 33.51 51.19 1
8 15505210 23 100 89 116 87.97 115.48 1
9 16733910 143 47 40 45 34.40 52.30 1
10 18678010 1 115 104 123 99.08 128.33 1
11 20323720 70 82 70 88 66.86 91.09 1
12 21148C10 195 17 18 15 11.87 22.86 1
13 21745410 128 50 48 52 41.19 60.66 1
14 25247810 145 49 39 44 33.51 51.19 1
15 26441120 200 18 13 15 9.87 19.99 1
16 26882010 124 46 38 66 40.01 58.45 1
17 27727010 1 118 106 121 99.34 128.67 1
18 31374720 7 131 120 101 96.26 125.11 0
19 33740010 2 116 114 112 99.29 128.69 1
20 37001910 101 70 55 72 52.56 74.16 1
21 40009710 144 58 42 42 34.07 51.93 0
22 40423210 1 109 88 139 94.79 122.76 1
23 40426510 1 145 104 123 99.08 128.33 0
24 42191510 126 46 63 39 39.88 58.47 1
25 42192110 138 49 42 48 36.60 55.00 1
26 42216910 145 48 47 36 33.06 50.49 1
27 44143820 1 127 108 119 99.54 128.93 1
28 45005810 1 134 111 116 99.72 129.17 0
29 50022810 165 32 28 35 24.49 39.73 1
30 51509610 169 31 23 36 21.97 36.16 1
31 55288510 1 126 112 115 99.75 129.21 1
32 55349510 119 59 51 58 45.13 65.42 1
33 58461M10 153 32 35 40 29.94 46.73 1
34 58501T10 131 32 58 39 38.41 56.87 0
35 58995110 167 32 27 34 23.61 38.59 1
36 58995210 150 34 28 50 28.99 44.80 1
37 58995310 165 24 25 38 23.78 38.54 1
38 63862010 133 48 59 36 36.78 54.65 1
39 64805910 52 93 90 86 76.00 101.91 1
40 65537910 131 44 49 53 39.56 58.60 1
41 68240610 102 69 62 64 53.03 74.94 1
42 69478510 131 54 46 51 39.80 58.95 1
43 70910210 2 119 111 115 99.27 128.66 1
44 72481910 2 117 110 116 99.23 128.61 1
45 74100410 2 115 99 127 97.79 126.74 1
46 74344510 1 112 115 112 99.75 129.21 1
47 75589310 123 56 48 57 43.19 63.03 1
48 75589510 117 49 61 50 45.78 66.13 1
49 80120920 78 93 70 80 63.76 87.58 0
50 80439610 65 86 74 89 69.44 94.18 1262 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Exhibit 5 (continued)
Nonparametric Tests of Persistence in Monthly Returns of EREITs
OBS CUSIP NMISS NRUNS UCNT DCNT W975 WO25 DRANDOM
51 83013710 146 44 38 44 33.01 50.55 1
52 86211010 95 69 64 69 56.16 78.65 1
53 89390210 87 82 63 78 59.24 82.17 1
54 90028310 188 20 11 29 12.10 21.80 1
55 90337010 41 108 85 102 80.47 106.98 0
56 91019710 63 80 94 71 69.59 94.20 1
57 91359E10 146 35 52 30 30.87 47.23 1
58 93965310 2 122 119 107 99.02 128.34 1
59 94874110 129 63 54 45 40.47 59.71 0
60 95846810 115 65 59 54 47.04 67.74 1
61 96200410 150 38 41 37 31.32 48.47 1
This exhibit reports the results of nonparametric runs tests for returns of EREITs over the period
1975–93. The tests are based on the number of runs, i.e., clustering of superior or inferior
performance in consecutive months, where performance is measured relative to the mean return
of all EREITs in a given month. Explanation of column headings:
OBS 5 An index identifying the ﬁrm.
CUSIP 5 The REIT’s CUSIP.
NMISS 5 The number of missing returns out of a total of 228 monthly observations. Note that
the REITs identiﬁed as OBS #12. and #15 are ignored because of too many missing
returns. The persistence tests required at least thirty-six monthly returns.
NRUNS 5 The number of observed runs in either good or bad performance.
UCNT 5 The number of months of superior performance.
DCNT 5 The number of months of inferior performance.
W025 5 The lower bound of the 95% conﬁdence interval for the expected number of runs.
W975 5 The upper bound of the 95% conﬁdence interval for the expected number of runs.
DRANDOM 5 A dummy variable that summarizes the results of the runs test. A value of 1 indicates
that the null hypothesis of randomness (no persistence) in returns cannot be
rejected; a value of 0 indicates a rejection of the null hypothesis.
Persistence in REIT Performance
The analysis presented addresses whether REIT returns are predictable in general. In
other words, it is an analysis of predictability at the market-wide level. In this section,
persistence tests are conducted to examine whether individual REITs can outperform
their peers. Grinblatt and Titman (1992) and Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993)
ﬁnd evidence of persistence in equity mutual fund returns. If it is easier to copy
successful investment strategies in real estate, or more difﬁcult for a REIT to exhibit
differential performance relative to other REITs, we would expect to ﬁnd less evidence
of persistence for REITs than stocks in general.
In order to ascertain whether REITs exhibit any positive or negative performance
persistence, nonparametric runs tests are conducted. A run is deﬁned as an
uninterrupted sequence of superior performance months or inferior performance
months. Nonparametric tests are used to avoid making any assumptions about the
distribution of returns in the sample.THE PREDICTABILITY OF EQUITY REIT RETURNS 263
By examining how runs behave in a strictly random sequence of observations versus
the actual number of runs observed, a test of persistence can be derived. Under the
null hypothesis that successive outcomes are independent, the number of runs, n,i s
distributed asymptotically normally with:
2NN 12 E(n) 51 1
N 1 N 12
and
2NN(2NN 2 N 2 N ) 12 12 1 2 s 5 n 2 !(N 1 N )( N 1 N 2 1) 12 12
where N1 is the number of instances of superior performance and N2 is the number
of instances of inferior performance.17
As an example, suppose that over the entire sample period of 252 months, a REIT
exhibited 126 months of superior performance and 126 months of months of inferior
performance. Under the null hypothesis of randomness, there would be no clustering
of superior or inferior performance months. The expected number of runs would be:
2 3 126 3 126
E(n) 51 1 5 127
126 1 126
and
2 3 126 3 126(2 3 126 3 126 2 126 2 126)
s 55 7.9 n 2 ! (126 1 126) (126 1 126 2 1)
Further suppose that this REIT exhibited 126 consecutive months of superior
performance, followed by 126 consecutive months of inferior performance. The
observed number of runs for this REIT would be 2, which is far below the lower
bound of the 95% conﬁdence interval and thus the null hypothesis of no persistence
(randomness) would be rejected. On the other hand, suppose that a month of superior
performance was always followed by a month of inferior performance. Such
oscillation would result in 251 observed runs, which is far above the upper bound of
the 95% conﬁdence interval, and the null hypothesis of randomness would again be
rejected. Note that a rejection of the null does not imply superior performance. It
simply means that the sequence does not appear to be random. Also note that the
tests do not consider the magnitude of superior or inferior performance in any given
month.
In the persistence tests, performance is measured for each month over the 1975–95
period relative to the mean performance of all REITs in that month. As a result, a
REIT is considered to have exhibited positive performance in month t if its return in264 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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that month is larger than the average return of all REITs in that month. Similarly, a
return that is lower than the average return of all REITs in that month would indicate
negative performance. A REIT is not included in the analysis if it does not have at
least two years of monthly return data available.
Exhibit 5 reports the results of the persistence tests. Of the sixty-one REITs examined,
ten exhibit performance persistence.18 For nine of these ten ﬁrms the observed number
of runs was signiﬁcantly higher than the expected value, which is consistent with the
autocorrelation results presented in Exhibit 1. These REITs display a tendency to
exhibit superior performance in one month and inferior performance in the following
month. Interestingly, though, an examination of the types of properties held by these
REITs indicates that six of the ten ﬁrms invest primarily in retail properties. Retail
REITs comprise only 27% of the ﬁrms examined for persistent runs. While this
particular sample size is small and thereby limits statistical inference, it suggests
researchers and investors may wish to see if the large number of new retail REIT
ﬁrms formed after 1992 also are characterized by this seemingly overreactive behavior.
Conclusion
This study has examined the predictability of returns on EREITs. Results indicate
statistically signiﬁcant evidence of predictability of monthly returns, which is largely
associated with return behavior between 1975–84 and 1993–95. However, the average
monthly return from the implied trading strategy is about 1.1% and is not large enough
to cover the transactions costs that would be necessary to exploit the ﬁnding. There
is no evidence this result is speciﬁc to a single property type, but the small sample
sizes available by property type make such a conclusion tentative at this time.
It may be that the low level of predictability of EREIT returns compared to that of
general stock returns reported by Jegadeesh (1990) is a statistical artifact of the smaller
sample size of ﬁrms available for real estate-focused analysis. However, the ﬁndings
also are consistent with what might be expected for ﬁrms in a market characterized
by long-term leases to credit tenants and little unexpected technological progress
affecting operating expenses.
In addition to the analysis of predictability for the general REIT market, the
persistence in return behavior at the individual ﬁrm level also was examined using
nonparametric tests. The results of these tests indicate that several REITs do exhibit
persistence, which appears to be overreactive in nature. In addition, retail REITs are
overrepresented among the ﬁrms exhibiting persistence.THE PREDICTABILITY OF EQUITY REIT RETURNS 265
Appendix































This Appendix reports the results of cross-sectional regressions of monthly excess stock returns
on past returns. The model is of the form:
12
˜ R 2 R 5 a 1 aR 1 u , O it it 0tj t i t 2ji t
j51
where Rit is the return on stock i in month t and Rit is the average monthly return on stock i over
the period t 1 1t ot 1 6. The regression is performed each month over the period of 1975–95. The
reported parameters are the average of the time series of coefﬁcients. The p-value (in parentheses)
is the probability that average of the time series of coefﬁcients is equal to zero.
Notes
1 Mei and Gao (1995) and Cooper, Downs and Patterson (1995) investigate REIT return
predictability using weekly data and ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant evidence of predictability.266 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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2 Transactions costs may be higher for small stocks in general, so returns net of transactions
costs may not be higher.
3 See Gyourko and Keim (1992) for the details on the number of ﬁrms since 1962.
4 This relatively short future horizon is used to proxy for expected returns in order to use as
many of the wave of new REITs as possible in our analysis. Twelve and twenty-four month
horizons were also investigated, but no meaningful result was sensitive to the horizon used to
estimate expected returns.
5 See, for example, Giliberto (1990) and Colwell and Park (1990).
6 This overreaction pattern is consistent with the ﬁndings using weekly data. See, for example,
Mei and Gao (1995) and Cooper, Downs and Patterson (1995).
7 Bhasin, Cole and Kiely (1997) report that spreads on EREITs have fallen in recent years,
raising the possibility that contrarian proﬁts have increased. However, these narrower spreads
are for larger ﬁrms on average, reﬂecting growth in the EREIT market. As is documented, the
predictability of mid-cap stocks in general is very low. Thus, the reduction in transactions costs
may be accompanied by a reduction in predictability.
8 Some REIT industry observers have suggested that a December effect may be emerging in
recent years. The level of predictability was investigated separately for December and was found
to be no different than the months of February through November. If a December effect does
exist, it may be too recent to affect our results.
9 A complete set of estimated lagged correlations for small- and mid-cap stocks is reported in
the Appendix. Results for January and for the eleven months excluding January are available
upon request.
10 Although the returns on the smallest publicly traded ﬁrms are more predictable in the sense
that the total return from this trading strategy is greater, it should be emphasized that transactions
costs may be higher for these ﬁrms. In particular, the bid-ask spread and the price impact of a
trade can be quite large for the smallest ﬁrms. In 1995, the average market capitalization for
ﬁrms in the tenth decile portfolio was only $14 million, so price impacts alone could be
meaningful. In any event, whether an arbitrage opportunity exists for small capitalization ﬁrms
in general is an issue outside the scope of this article.
11 Most non real-estate-related small-cap ﬁrms create value by bringing new products or
technologies to market or by introducing a material change in a production process. Gyourko
and Siegel (1994) document that whether they are successful ends up being reﬂected in share
price appreciation, as a key difference between EREITs and other small capitalization ﬁrms is
the importance of dividends versus capital gains in their total returns. For the typical small ﬁrm
not in the real estate industry, capital gains are the dominant component of total return, while
for similarly sized EREITs, dividends drive total returns.
12 The same conclusion would apply to apartment REITs, even though they do not sign long-
term leases. In the multifamily sector, rental household formation is fairly easily predicted
because it is so dependent upon the age distribution of households. That distribution is well
known, with changes in it easily anticipated, except in rare markets subject to substantial
immigration. For example, see Rosen’s (1996) analysis of apartment market fundamentals.
13 A test of this hypothesis can be performed in the near future. The mean market capitalization
of the mid-cap stocks from the sixth decile of the ﬁrm size distribution was $220 million in
1995—the ﬁnal year of our data series. In early 1997, 79% of the ﬁrms in the Paine Webber
Equity REIT Index have equity market capitalizations above $220 million. Given the
extraordinarily strong performance of the stock market in 1996 in particular, there is no doubt
that the mean market capitalization of ﬁrms in the sixth decile of the size distribution has also
risen. Nevertheless, there also is no doubt that average EREIT size has risen relative to theTHE PREDICTABILITY OF EQUITY REIT RETURNS 267
stock market as a whole. Hence, future work in this area should disaggregate REITs by size
and examine their autocorrelation structures to see if there are any material differences.
14 Results for the EREITs only are reported in this subsection. The small- and mid-cap portfolios
were also analyzed. However, the results yielded rankings and conclusions similar to those
reported in Exhibit 2. They are available upon request.
15 To determine if IPO activity affected the results, the number of new ﬁrms that entered our
sample each month was examined. Fewer than three ﬁrms entered the sample in any month
until late 1993 when REIT IPOs increased signiﬁcantly. Consequently, the ﬁndings for the ﬁrst
two subperiods are not likely to be related to new REIT offerings.
16 It was not feasible to disaggregate the retail REITs, as there were no regional mall or outlet
mall REITs prior to 1992.
17 For a more detailed discussion of the theory of runs tests, see Conover (1971).
18 The smaller sample size here is due to the necessity of having a long time period over which
to identify runs. Thus, none of the new wave of post-1992 REITs are examined in this section.
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